pinkfloydpsw's Blog

Can lying be justified?

This question automatically prejudices the debate in that it is the act of not telling the truth rather than the act of telling the truth that is asked to justify itself. this automatically pre-supposes that there must be some inherent virtue in communicating perceived truth and some inherent fault in deliberately misrepresenting perceived truth. Clearly there are circumstances where telling the truth appears virtuous, and also instances where lying appears so. There must be many exceptions to any general rule regarding the merits of these opposing positions.

The classic dichotomy in philosophical debate on the ethics of lying exists in the thoughts of Kant and Mill (and their supporters) though it is important to note that this argument is one of the right course of action being a constant and consistent path not open to circumstantial change. For Kant actions are either moral or they are not and lying is either moral or it is not regardless of positive or negative outcomes arising from the act. For Mill on the other hand the consequences of an act determines whether or not the act is moral and so long as it is of some use or benefit to the majority it is justifiable, lying can therefore be justified on the basis of the outcome that arises from it. Both parties select their own rules and parameters for justifying their points of view and both present valid and compelling arguments. Unfortunately, while both are commendable both are also fundamentally flawed at the same time (there are lots of other less well known theories that illustrate this). Attempting to construct a single universal model through philosophical means may also be flawed.

Can there be alternatives/variations to the exclusivity of Actions Versus Consequences with regard to lying?

Kant groups similar actions as single/universal events. Lying is thereby a single action (not telling the truth). Lying again is just a repetition of the same action. The single action (lying) is therefore either always right or always wrong. In this paradigm the only logical alternative to actions are indeed consequences. However, if lying is not one uniform action but rather a range of distinct actions/sub-actions/hybrid actions/meta actions etc…, each with their own set of variables then any polarity between an action and a consequence becomes unsafe and invites further consideration.

The action versus consequences polarity possibly neglects the process element between the two states. Even if lying could be shown to be a single uniform event rather than a multiplicity of varying actions, it nonetheless involves a dynamic, linking the start and end points. That dynamic process is omitted from the action/consequence only model unless it is regarded as part of either the original action, or the resulting consequence, of both.

Unanticipated consequences. There is a tendency to assume that the consequences of lying must be known to the participant at the time of telling the lie, and that any judgement of the merits of lying should be based on this prior knowledge. However, if some good or bad arises unwittingly as a result of the lie then the judgement made upon it might alter.

The problem of philosophical methodology

Philosophers rely on either deductive or inductive methodologies or a combination of both. Each however, can be shown to be flawed. Whittgenstein proposed that statements that can be deduced are tautological (empty of meaning) as well as being analytical truths. For example 2+2=4 is an analytical truth but is also a nonsense. Henri Poincare (an early socialist thinker) had apparently made similar remarks in Science and Hypothesis in 1905. Inductive methods don’t arrive at factual outcomes but still present strong probabilities which can be demonstrated to be false; A classic example of an incorrect inductive argument was presented by John Vickers:

All of the swans we have seen are white. Therefore, all swans are white.

The positions taken by both Kant and Mill can be made either true or false based on the values assigned to their propositional variables. This probably applies to much of philosophy and may even extend into most or all methodologies in all areas of knowledge or understanding. New philosophies will doubtless reveal more new truths.

Is telling the truth ever justified?

David J Watts and Paul S Wilson